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1. Without further specification, the word «anthropology» has nowadays little to do 
with philosophy. Rather, especially but not exclusively in English-speaking countries, 
it is mainly used to denote the field of «cultural anthropology»1. As we shall see, the 
names of several philosophers recur in what one may call – to avoid confusion – the 
pre-history of cultural anthropology. However, the history of cultural anthropology is 
the history of the development of a scientific community (together with its 
institutions: private societies, public organisations, academic departments, and so on) 
recognising itself in a certain methodological approach2. Since the core of this 
methodology, generally speaking, is the «fieldwork», cultural anthropology is clearly 
independent of philosophy and frequently opposes its «armchair» methodology3.  
Therefore, it seems quite reasonable to define the relatively wide field of 
philosophical investigations concerning man as philosophical anthropology. The 
difference with cultural anthropology, i.e. – in nowadays prevalent sense –
 anthropology tout court, is thus clearly remarked. Unfortunately, this move faces us 
with supplementary difficulties. In fact, the phrase philosophical anthropology 
frequently denotes a specific approach to the question, developed in Germany in the 
late Twenties of the XX century by Max Scheler and Helmuth Plessner, and later by 
Arnold Gehlen and others4. Recently, Joachim Fischer has proposed to distinguish 
this historically determined Philosophical Anthropology, with capital letters, from 
philosophical anthropology in the general sense of a «sub-discipline of philosophy», in 
which a wide range of philosophical methodologies and approaches (i.e., not only 
those of Philosophical Anthropology in the above sense) is applied to the question of 
man, together with «the presentation (Vergegenwärtigung) of the history of 
anthropological self-reflexion»5.  
Fischer has devoted his outstanding book to the history of Philosophical 
Anthropology in the first sense: a specific line of thought (Denkrichtung) of the 
Twentieth Century. However, what about the historical development of philosophical 
anthropology in the other, less determined sense of a «sub-discipline» of philosophy? 
Is this development simply identical to the general history of moral philosophy since 
                                                 
1 Obviously, there is also a more general, non-scientific use of the word. One could 
speak, for instance, of Shakespeare’s or Michelangelo’s anthropology. This case will be 
not considered hereafter.  
2 See Stocking 1983, 1987; Barnard 2000; Eriksen and Nielsen 2001.  
3 From a history of science point of view, the case under discussion shows some close 
resemblance to that of psychology, where the adoption of an experimental method 
plays the central role in distinguishing the discipline form philosophy.  
4 According to Scheler, in 1928 philosophical anthropology was not anymore a mere 
«discipline» (Scheler 1928).  
5 Fischer 2008, 9; see also Fischer 2000, 5.    
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the Delphic and Socratic gnôthi seautón, as someone argued6? Or does anthropology 
necessarily imply, on the contrary, a non-philosophical or half-philosophical attitude, 
as detractors repeatedly complained7?  
Somewhere else I argued that the complex relationship of philosophy with 
anthropology in the history of modern thought cannot be properly understood 
through oversimplifying evaluations of this kind8. Rather, many different 
methodological approaches must be taken into account. On the one side, sources-
oriented researches9 and the history of concepts 10 provided some general criteria, 
partly in connection with the explicit occurrences of the term «anthropology» within 
philosophical tradition. Yet, many questions still remain open. Did we investigate 
systematically enough what philosophers meant by using, or avoiding, or explicitly 
refusing the word anthropology (or any related expressions)? In any case, does this 
exhaust the question of a philosophical anthropology? On the other side, historians of 
philosophy, historians of science and historians of ideas have shown – among other 
things – that even the pre-history of cultural anthropology and of other «sciences of 
man» has a lot to do with the development of philosophical anthropology. In other 
words, the undisputed sharpness of nowadays’ distinction between cultural and 
philosophical anthropology blurs considerably when we look at the past, and 
sometimes results misleading. Actually, modern philosophers have been constantly 
interested in the results of anthropology and ethnology, which provided valuable 
empirical tests for philosophical theories concerning the human mind, the political 
order, language, and so on11. Moreover, direct interaction and mutual influence 
between anthropologists and philosophers can be established in many cases12.  
  
 
2. For many reasons, these questions have not raised enough attention in the last 
decades. First, Philosophical Anthropologists (with capital letters in the above sense) 
comprehensibly suggested the idea of a radical gap between their approach and the 
past ones. Thus, no less than many of their detractors, they ended up by suggesting a 
radically discontinuous historical development of philosophical anthropology. 
Secondly, many influential Twentieth-Century philosophers warned against 
anthropological degenerations of philosophy, sometimes condemned as 
«anthropologism»13. Among them one could list no less thinkers than Husserl, 
Heidegger, Foucault but also, from a radically different standpoint, Horkheimer and 
Habermas14. Properly speaking, they generally attacked on their contemporaries (i.e. 
on Philosophical Anthropology), yet their negative attitude also deeply influenced the 
                                                 
6 Groethuysen 1931; Brüning 1960; Landmann 1962.  
7 See Foucault 1966; Husserl 1931; Heidegger 1928.  
8 Martinelli 2004. Please refer to this book for further references concerning many of 
the themes under discussion.  
9 Linden 1976.  
10 See Marquard 1965; 1971. For a criticism, see my contribution in this issue.  
11 See Landucci 1972; Gliozzi 1977.  
12 For instance, J.F. Blumenbach and Kant: see Lenoir 1980.   
13 Once more, the parallel with psychology and the question of «psychologism» is 
quite clear.  
14 Husserl 1931; Heidegger 1929; Foucault 1966; Horkheimer 1935; Habermas 1958.  
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level of historical reconstruction. Although probably directed against Plessner, 
Heidegger’s criticism, for instance, is formulated against Kant’s anthropology; 
Horkheimer quotes Joseph de Maistre as an example of the link between naturalistic 
anthropology and reactionary political theory; Foucault’s influential criticisms of 
anthropology essentially refers to the «âge classique». Finally, the sharp debate 
concerning Marx’ alleged juvenile «anthropology» reveals some heavy ideological 
implications. Actually, until not so many years ago, this question was deeply 
interwoven with the problem of political freedom in East-European communist 
countries: supporting «anthropology» within Marxism (e.g. following Marx’ 
Manuscripts) was tantamount to dismissing orthodoxy in favour of reforms programs 
– with occasionally dramatic consequences15.  
Almost a century after the birth of Philosophical Anthropology, no such 
ideological complications are anymore on the way, and a generalised refusal of 
anthropological perspectives in philosophy makes no sense. New researches on the 
proposed topic are thus strongly required. Although they offer interesting insights, 
Plessner’s or Gehlen’s sketches of historical reconstructions cannot be anymore 
assumed as a priori indisputable authoritative standpoints16. Nor do similarity or 
respondence with their (or others’) theories represent a privileged criterium to 
investigate previous developments. However, Twentieth-Century Philosophical 
Anthropology cannot be isolated and excluded from the task. This claim does not 
imply any loss of specificity: rather, a better definition of the general context could be 
helpful in solving some difficulties in understanding the history  and defining the 
limits of Philosophical Anthropology.   
 
 
3. The following essays focus on different thinkers and problems, aiming in each case 
at an in-depth access to the roots of the discussed problems. The issue is far from 
aiming at an exhaustive picture, however a rather wide area is covered. In my own 
contribution, I tried to undermine Odo Marquard’s view of philosophical 
anthropology as intrinsically opposed to philosophy of history. More frequently, 
anthropology implies history and contends with psychology for a leading role. Marco 
Russo is concerned with the intriguing theme of Kant’s «mundana sapientia» and its 
importance for anthropology. Faustino Fabbianelli focuses his attention on K.L. 
Reinhold, J.G. Fichte, and the complex semantics of anthropology, psychology and 
the «transcendental» at that time. Guido Cusinato underlines Schelling’s role in 
leading the way towards later Philosophical Anthropology. Nina Dmitrieva’s essay 
presents the situation of anthropology from the point of view of Russian Neo-
kantianism. Avoiding commonplace reconstructions of Nietzsche’s anthropological 
ideas, Chiara Piazzesi investigates the semantic of passions. Vincenzo Costa considers 
the problem from the point of view of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s phenomenological 
analysis, discussing intentionality among humans and non-human animals. Vallori 
Rasini reflects upon the very sense of philosophical anthropology according to 
Helmuth Plessner. Alberto Gualandi draws attention on the problem of a philosophy 
of history from Gehlen’s point of view. I wish to express them all of my gratitude for 
                                                 
15 See Márkus 1966; Lepenies-Nolte 1971.  
16 For instance, Plessner 1937; Gehlen 1940, 1957.  
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their contribution. Special thanks to Fabiana Aizza and Federico Skodler for their 
friendly help in editing this issue.  
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